Friday, July 12, 2019

CitySt.PaulSued AgainFri12July2019ThanksBobHurtCaseLaw

  Fri.12July2019    CitySt.Paul  Equity Skimming Big time
                     https://sharon4council.blogspot.com/2008/05/sharons-default-judgments-v-city-st.html

                 
             Please read  Todays paper by 
Fred Melo Legal Appeal  Fight Overlay Fees
                       Remember Carter was on Council 2011
                      Reporter Fred has ALL FORNSIC FILES ON YOU.
Legal appeal fights mill and overlay charges, seeks to move them onto St. Paul property taxes

Legal appeal fights mill and overlay charges, seeks to move them onto St. Paul property taxes

PUBLISHED: July 11, 2019 at 3:21 pm   | UPDATED: July 11, 2019 at 6:49 pm

St. Paul housing dispute raised in fight over labor secretary

PUBLISHED: April 14, 2013 at 11:01 pm   | UPDATED: November 7, 2015 at 5:54 am

Justice Department’s role in St. Paul’s decision to drop Supreme Court case questioned

PUBLISHED: September 24, 2012 at 11:01 pm   | UPDATED: November 10, 2015 at 2:59 am

  216 Bates was Bought for ONE DOLLAR



From: sharon4anderson@aol.com
To:
Sent: 7/11/2019 8:33:25 AM Central Standard Time
Subject: Remove Unscribe

                         All items deleted Sorry to market your  ??"?SOunsubscribe

In a message dated 7/10/2019 2:17:52 PM Central Standard Time, 
Hello Sharon.
Again, I’m not sure what the below information is, or how it is relevant.

Please remove or don’t use this email address from group email chains. I try to use this email for professional and work conversations. 
Thanks!
Cory

:51:15 PM Central Standard Time, 
I’m not sure what all of the information below is, but how can I help?

Cory

Cory Vandenberghe
The Railing Shop Collective
www.therailingshop.co
C: 612-245-9499

Digitalives | Marketing
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xx                   INTERESTING CASE LAW

Bob Hurt <bob@bobhurt.com>: Jun 27 06:43PM -0400 

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: ***SPAM*** United States Supreme Court News
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 18:07:38 -0000
From: Willamette Law Online <wlo-info@willamette.edu>
Reply-To: wlo-info@willamette.edu




United States Supreme Court News
Willamette Law Online - Willamette University College of Law
The United States Supreme Court has issued the following opinions:


DECISIONS
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: When determining whether a court must follow an
order issued by an administrative agency, a court must first determine
whether the order is legislative or interpretive and whether the
petitioner had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review
of the order. [Read Summary Online]

(2) CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: Property owners with an actionable takings
claim are no longer required to litigate state action for just
compensation before pursuing a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
overruling Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985). [Read Summary Online]

(3) CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: The statute of limitations for a claim brought
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging the use of fabricated evidence, begins
to run when criminal proceedings against a defendant are terminated in
his or her favor. [Read Summary Online]

(4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) provision 34 U. S. C. §§20913(d), does not violate the
nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to enforce and
apply the Act registration requirements to pre-Act offenders. [Read
Summary Online]

(5) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: States may not tax trusts based solely on the
in-state residency of a beneficiary. [Read Summary Online]

(6) CRIMINAL LAW: A state may not use preemptory challenges that are
substantially motivated by discriminatory intent to strike prospective
jurors in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and
United States Supreme Court precedent. [Read Summary Online]

(7) CRIMINAL LAW: In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the
Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a
firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons
barred from possessing a firearm. [Read Summary Online]

(8) FIRST AMENDMENT: Under the Establishment Clause, the passage of time
gives rise to a presumption of constitutionality for monuments, symbols,
and practices, even where such monuments, symbols, or practices include
symbolic references to faith. [Read Summary Online]

DECISIONS
(1) PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

Date Filed: June 20, 2019
Case #: 17-1705
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1705_8n59.pdf

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: When determining whether a court must follow an
order issued by an administrative agency, a court must first determine
whether the order is legislative or interpretive and whether the
petitioner had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review
of the order.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)prohibits any person from
faxing an unsolicited advertisement. 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). The
Administrative Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act) gives federal courts of
appeals “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend. . . or to
determine the validity of . . . final orders of the Federal
Communication Commission"(FCC). 28 U.S.C. §2342(1). The FCC issued an
order in 2006 which included faxes promoting free materials as
“unsolicited advertisements.” Petitioners sent a fax to Respondents
promoting Petitioner’s free reference manual. Respondents claim this
violated the TCPA. The district court dismissed the case. The Fourth
Circuit vacated, and held that the district court should have adopted
the 2006 FCC interpretation of “unsolicited advertisement,” which
includes faxes promoting free goods. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the Hobbs Act requires a district court
to follow the FCC’s order. The Court vacated and remanded for the lower
court to decide two preliminary questions. First, whether the 2006 FCC
Order is a legislative rule issued pursuant to statutory authority and
having the force of law, or an interpretive rule which lacks the force
of law. Second, whether PDR had a previous and adequate opportunity to
seek judicial review of the FCC’s Order. If they did not, then the APA
may permit Petitioner to challenge the Order’s validity in this
proceeding. VACATED and REMANDED.[Summarized by: Margaret Dick]

(2) Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania

Date Filed: June 21, 2019
Case #: 17-647
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a
concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-647_m648.pdf

CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: Property owners with an actionable takings claim
are no longer required to litigate state action for just compensation
before pursuing a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, overruling
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985).

Petitioner owns property containing a small ancestral cemetery and was
notified that she violated an ordinance that required “all” cemeteries
be open to the public during the day. Petitioner sought declaratory
relief in state court alleging the ordinance “effected a taking” of the
property, but did not seek compensation through “inverse condemnation.”
The court found that Petitioner did not show irreparable harm for which
relief could be granted. Petitioner filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  The
district court dismissed, finding that under Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985),
Petitioner had not pursued the required action for just compensation in
state court and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
overruled Williamson County, reasoning in favor of its holding in San
Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U. S. 323
(2005), concluding the just compensation state-litigation requirement
placed an “unjustifiable burden” and Catch-22 upon any property owner
with an actionable takings claim because when a claim is filed first in
state court, the owner runs the risk of the preclusive effect of barring
the federal court action if the state action is unsuccessful. VACATED
and REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Jodi Maynard]

(3) McDonough v. Smith

Date Filed: June 20, 2019
Case #: 18-485
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.
J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-485_g2bh.pdf

CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: The statute of limitations for a claim brought
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging the use of fabricated evidence, begins
to run when criminal proceedings against a defendant are terminated in
his or her favor.

Petitioner was criminally prosecuted for allegedly processing forged
primary election ballots in Troy, New York. After aquittal, Petitioner
sued Respondent under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging Respondent fabricated
evidence to convict Petitioner of criminal charges and malicious
prosecution. The district court dismissed both claims, holding the §1983
claims as untimely. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the 

statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner had knowledge of the
fabricated evidence, and when he suffered a loss of liberty as a result.
The Supreme Court begins with identifying which liberty was infringed
upon, and agrees with Petitioner that the common law tort of malicious
prosecution was the injury suffered. Analogizing Petitioner’s case
to Heck v. Humphrey, with the aid of Wallace v. Kato, the Court finds
that challenging fabricated evidence in a criminal proceeding prior to
its termination would likely create parallel civil and criminal
litigation over the same topic. To avoid accrual of such litigation, the
statute of limitations must begin at the termination of the criminal
proceeding. The holding is further supported by the desire to avoid
issues in jurisdictions where prosecutions can last as long or longer
than the relevant civil limitations period. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Matthew Flores]

(4) Gundy v. United States

Date Filed: June 20, 2019
Case #: 17-6086
KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-6086_2b8e.pdf

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) provision 34 U. S. C. §§20913(d), does not violate the
nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to enforce and
apply the Act registration requirements to pre-Act offenders.

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C.
§20913, mandates that sex offenders register before completion of their
prison sentences. Petitioner, a pre-Act offender released from prison
post-Act, was convicted of failing to register. Petitioner argued that
Congress’ delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General
regarding the applicability of SORNA to pre-Act offenders was
unconstitutional. The district court and the Second Circuit rejected
Petitioner’s claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the
nondelegation doctrine prohibits the transfer of legislative power by
Congress to another branch of government; however, this Court held
in Reynolds v. United States,that the limited authority given to the
Attorney General to apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders is constitutional.
565 U.S. 432 (2012). The Reynolds Court found that Congress intended the
“basic statutory purpose” and “sex offender definition” of SORNA to
include pre-Act offenders and understood that registering offenders who
were never previously required to register, were missing, or dead, were
legal complications. These complications allowed delegation to the
Attorney General of the executive branch and required enforcement and
application of the Act to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”  This
limited delegation of authority does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine. AFFIRMED.

[Summarized by: Jodi Maynard]

(5) North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Trust

Date Filed: June 20, 2019
Case #: 18-457
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GORSUCH, J.,
joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-457_2034.pdf

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: States may not tax trusts based solely on the
in-state residency of a beneficiary.

The trust to which Respondent is a beneficiary was taxed by Petitioner,
although she had not received any income during the years at issue.
Respondent argues that the tax violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent’s trustee filed suit in state court,
which held in favor for Respondent, holding that the tax was
unconstitutional because the requisite connection between the State and
the trust was lacking. The state court of appeals and supreme court both
affirmed. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that States are prohibited from taxing trusts “based only on the
in-state residency of trust beneficiaries.” The Court reasoned that, in
applying International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), a
state is permitted to impose taxes only when “certain minimum contacts”
have been established. Similar state taxes have been held constitutional
where the trust itself, its trustees, or any income distributed
therefrom reside or occur within the state. However, the “presence of
in-state beneficiaries alone” is not enough to support the taxation of a
trust when those beneficiaries have not received income, have no right
to demand income, and may never actually receive income from the trust.
Therefore, the State’s tax is unconstitutional. AFFIRMED.[Summarized
by: Teresa Schulte]

(6) Flowers v. Mississippi

Date Filed: June 21, 2019
Case #: 17-9572
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.
J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-9572_k536.pdf

CRIMINAL LAW: A state may not use preemptory challenges that are
substantially motivated by discriminatory intent to strike prospective
jurors in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and
United States Supreme Court precedent.

Petitioner, a black man, stood trial for the murders of four people a
total of six times. The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned several of
the previous convictions for prosecutorial misconduct. Among other
instances of misconduct, the State of Mississippi used preemptory
strikes to dismiss prospective black jurors and the court found these
strikes to be racially motivated. At the sixth trial, the State used
preemptory strikes to dismiss five of the six prospective black jurors.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and upheld it on
remand after appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The United
States Supreme Court applied the rule from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), that prohibits a state from racial discrimination in a
preemptory challenge of a prospective juror in a criminal trial. The
Court examined four categories of evidence to find a clear pattern of
racial discrimination over the course of Petitioner’s trials. The Court
reviewed the large disparity in the treatment, questioning, and number
of black prospective jurors dismissed compared to white jurors in each
trial. The Court specifically found clear error in the dismissal of one
black prospective juror at the sixth trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Ayla O'Scannell]

(7) Rehaif v. United States

Date Filed: June 21, 2019
Case #: 17-9560
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-9560_new_onkq.pdf

CRIMINAL LAW: In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the
Government must prove both that the defendant knew he
Bob Hurt <bob@bobhurt.com>: Jul 01 07:01PM -0400 

United States Supreme Court News
Willamette Law Online - Willamette University College of Law
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the following
cases and issued the following opinions:


DECISIONS
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Under the Auer deference doctrine, courts should
defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a regulation only where
such regulation is ambiguous; unambiguous regulations must be given the
effect of their plain meaning. [Read Summary Online]

(2) ADMIRALTY: Punitive damages are unavailable for mariner plaintiffs
in claims of unseaworthiness. [Read Summary Online]

(3) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: State-mandated durational residence requirements
for business owners applying for retail liquor store licensing is
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and is not protected
by the Twenty-First Amendment § 2. [Read Summary Online]

(4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a
crime of violence as an "offense that by its nature involves a risk of
force" mandates the use of a categorical approach, making the clause
unconstitutionally vague. [Read Summary Online]

(5) CORPORATIONS: Under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act,
commercial and financial information that is “customarily and actually
treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an
assurance of [express or implied] privacy” is deemed confidential. [Read
Summary Online]

(6) CRIMINAL LAW: The mandatory minimum sentence imposed by 18 U.S.C. §
3853(k) violates the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. [Read Summary Online]

(7) FIRST AMENDMENT: The prohibition against immoral or scandalous
trademarks in 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) is viewpoint based discrimination and
violates the First Amendment. [Read Summary Online]

CERTIORARI
(1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to
Resolve an Important Point of Law and a Conflict Between Circuits
Concerning Judicial Review of an Interpretive VA Regulation Under the
Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It Should Be Foreclosed Under
38 U.S.C. § 502 When the Veterans Judicial Reform Act Provides the Sole
Avenue for Review of the Secretary’s Decisions [Read Summary Online]

(2) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §
314(d), permits appeal of the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter
partes review upon finding that the Act's § 315(b) time bar did not
apply. [Read Summary Online]

(3) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 502 to review an
interpretive rule reflecting the Department of Veterans Affairs’
definitive interpretation of its own regulation, even if the VA chooses
to promulgate that rule through its adjudication manual. [Read Summary
Online]

(4) CIVIL PROCEDURE: Whether a request for equitable tolling by a person
subject to the criminal alien bar is a factual determination such that
judicial review is precluded by 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) or a legal
determination such that it is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) as a
question of law. [Read Summary Online]

(5) COPYRIGHT: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to––and
thus renders uncopyrightable––works that lack the force of law, such as
the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. [Read Summary
Online]

(6) CRIMINAL LAW: Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule
59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas
petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). [Read Summary
Online]

(7) INSURANCE LAW: Whether a congressional intent derived from the
legislative history of an appropriations rider can impliedly repeal a
statutory payment obligation of the government. [Read Summary Online]

DECISIONS
(1) Kisor v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Date Filed: June 26, 2019
Case #: 18-15
KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, III–B, and IV, in which
ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an
opinion with respect to Parts II–A and III–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER,
and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring
in part. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which THOMAS, J., joined, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined as to Parts I,
II, III, IV, and V, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I, II,
and III. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which ALITO, J., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-15_9p6b.pdf

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Under the Auer deference doctrine, courts should
defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a regulation only where
such regulation is ambiguous; unambiguous regulations must be given the
effect of their plain meaning.

Petitioner sought disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder
from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Petitioner's claim was
denied, but reopened his claim with a new psychiatric report. The VA
granted disability benefits going forward but would not grant
retroactive benefits to the original application date without new
“relevant” records. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and Court
of Appeals Federal Circuit both affirmed but the later did so based
on Auer deference for the Board’s interpretation of its rule. The
Supreme Court held the court below did not use all of its interpretive
tools prior to determining ambiguity and applying Auer deference. The
Court granted certiorari specifically to decide whether to
overrule Auer as Petitioner argues and the Court answered “No.” The
Court must be convinced that Auer deference is wrong and also
overcome stare decisis, which demands “special justification”. Because
deference traces back to late nineteenth century, the Court has
repeatedly held agency interpretations as the controlling weight when
regulation is ambiguous, unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.
However, deference can only be used once a court finds the regulation
genuinely ambiguous, exhausting all interpretive tools of construction
as if there were no agency. Agency interpretation must also reflect
“fair and considered judgment” to receive Auer deference. VACATED and
REMANDED to reconsider whether Auer deference is warranted, bearing in
mind the principles outlined in this opinion.[Summarized
by: Jessica Watkins]

(2) Dutra Group v. Batterton

Date Filed: June 24, 2019
Case #: 18-266
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, K AGAN, G ORSUCH, and K AVANAUGH, JJ., joined. G INSBURG,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which B REYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-266_m6io.pdf

ADMIRALTY: Punitive damages are unavailable for mariner plaintiffs in
claims of unseaworthiness.

Respondent is a mariner that was injured while working on Petitioner’s
vessel and sought general and punitive damages in federal court.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the punitive damages claim, arguing punitive
damages are not available for unseaworthiness actions.  The district
court denied the motion but certified an interlocutory appeal on the
question. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding punitive
damages are available for claims of unseaworthiness, reaffirming a
circuit court split on the issue. The Supreme Court reversed, following
precedent in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19 (1990),
and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 404
(2009).  Miles established the primary focus for the Court is to
consider “legislative enactments for policy guidance,” but also stated
that the Court may supplement statutory remedies to ensure the policies
served by the statutes are upheld. In Atlantic Sounding, the Court
allowed a punitive damage award noting a historical basis for “certain
maritime torts, including maintenance and cure.” In the instant case,
finding no historical basis or precedent to allow punitive damages for
unseaworthiness and to further uniform application in decisions, the
Court held that punitive damages “remain unavailable in unseaworthiness
actions.”  REVERSED and REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Jodi Maynard]

(3) Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers v. Thomas, Exec. Dir. of the
Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission

Date Filed: June 26, 2019
Case #: 18-96
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and GINSBURG, B REYER, S OTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-96_5i36.pdf

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: State-mandated durational residence requirements for
business owners applying for retail liquor store licensing is
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and is not protected
by the Twenty-First Amendment § 2.

Petitioner is a trade association for in-state liquor retailers.
Respondent, acting under the direction of the state attorney general,
declined to enforce statutory residency requirements on applicants with
non-resident stockholders. Petitioner brought suit and the case was
removed to federal court. The district court, following U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460 (2005), concluded the
residential requirements were unconstitutional. Petitioner appealed.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the state residential
requirements were “facially discriminate against out-of-state economic
interests” and unconstitutional under the Twenty-First Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause precedents. However, the circuit divided over
the constitutionality specific to the 2-year residential requirement for
an initial license. Petitioner sought certiorari, specifically
challenging the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the 2-year residency
requirement applicable to initial liquor store applicants. The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the 2-year residency requirement
favored in-state residents over out-of-state residents, thus violating
the dormant Commerce Clause. Further, as the requirement relates to the
sale of alcohol, the Court considered the Twenty-First Amendment §2,
which grants latitude to the states for legislation of alcohol, but
reasoned that §2 is not intended to allow states “to restrict the
importation of alcohol for purely protectionist purposes.” The Court
held a 2-year durational residency requirement applicable to retail
liquor store initial license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and
is not shielded by the Twenty-First Amendment §2. AFFIRMED.

[Summarized by: Jodi Maynard]

(4) United States v. Davis

Date Filed: June 24, 2019
Case #: 18-431
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which
ROBERTS, C. J., joined as to all but Part II–C.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-431_7758.pdf

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of
violence as an "offense that by its nature involves a risk of force"
mandates the use of a categorical approach, making the clause
unconstitutionally vague.

A jury found Respondents guilty on multiple counts that included two
separate violations of §924(c) based on Respondents brandishing a
shotgun during robberies. Respondents appealed the convictions under
§924(c)’s residual clause, arguing that §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a
crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague under Supreme Court
precedent. The Fifth Circuit agreed but sustained most of Respondents’
convictions under §924(c)(3)(A). Respondents sought a rehearing and
argued that the Fifth Circuit should have vacated all their convictions
under §924(c) after deeming the residual clause unconstitutionally
vague, which prompted Petitioner to seek further review of
§924(c)(3)(B)’s constitutionality before a full resentencing occurred.
The Supreme Court affirmed that §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of
violence made the residual clause unconstitutionally vague. The Court
reasoned that the legislative history and language of §924(c)(3)(B)
mandated a categorical approach requiring judges to apply the residual
clause to an imagined “ordinary case” of an offense, as opposed to
real-world conduct. The Court then cited prior precedent deeming such a
categorical approach vague because it requires a judgment based on an
abstraction with respect to an unspecified level of risk. Accordingly,
the Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s decision to address
Respondent’s rehearing petitions. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Connor McDonald]

(5) Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media

Date Filed: June 24, 2019
Case #: 18-481
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C.J.,and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
Full Text
Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf

CORPORATIONS: Under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act,
commercial and financial information that is “customarily and actually
treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an
assurance of [express or implied] privacy” is deemed confidential.

Petitioner is an intervening party to a dispute between Respondent and
the United States Department of Agriculture. Respondent requested access
to “store-level data” regarding a nutrition assistance program, which
the USDA retained. The USDA invoked Exemption 4 of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), which shields disclosure of certain confidential
information. Respondent sued to compel disclosure. A federal district
court found for Respondent and Petitioner intervened, appealing to the
Eight Circuit, which affirmed. The Supreme Court first answers the
question of whether Petitioner meets all factors required for standing,
holding that it does. It then addresses the meaning of “confidential” as
it is used in the FOIA. Finding that the lower courts grafted National
Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton’s “competitive harm” test into the
statute, the Court decides that they skipped the first step of looking
to the common meaning of the term. The Court disagrees with this
reliance on legislative history, and instead defines the term using
Webster’s Dictionary. It further finds that earlier courts of appeals
have accurately applied the same analysis, and agrees that Exemption 4
protects information that an individual wishes to keep private under
either an express or implied promise from the government. REVERSED and
REMANDED.

[Summarized by: Matthew Flores]

(6) United States v. Haymond

Date Filed: June 26, 2019
Case #: 17-1672
GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS,


Bob Hurt <bob@bobhurt.com>: Jun 26 09:24PM -0400 

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Bob Hurt <bob@bobhurt.com>: Jun 24 11:20AM -0400 

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Publius Huldah column
How states can /man-up/ and stop abortion


Publius Huldah
*Publius Huldah* <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah>
June 23, 2019

If the American People [and American lawyers] had been properly
educated, they would know that our federal Constitution created a
federal government of enumerated powers only; and that most of the
powers delegated to Congress over the Country at Large are listed at
Art. I, §8, clauses 1-16, US Constitution.

"Abortion" is not listed among the enumerated powers. Therefore,
Congress has no power to make any laws about abortion for the Country at
Large.^*1* <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn1> And since
"abortion" isn't "expressly contained" in the Constitution, it doesn't
"arise under" the Constitution; and since state laws restricting
abortion don't fit within any of the other categories of cases the
federal courts are authorized by Art. III, §2, cl. 1 to hear, the
federal courts also have no power over this issue.

So from the beginning of our Constitutional Republic until 1973,
everyone understood that /abortion is a State matter/. Accordingly, many
State Legislatures enacted statutes restricting abortion within their
borders.

But in 1973, the US Supreme Court issued its opinion in Roe v. Wade
<https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/410/113.html> and made the
absurd claim that Section 1 of the 14th Amendment contains a "right" to
abortion. In Why Supreme Court opinions are not the 'Law of the Land,'
and how to put federal judges in their place
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/181115>, I showed why the
Supreme Court's opinion in /Roe/ is unconstitutional.

But Americans have long been conditioned to believe that the
Constitution means whatever the Supreme Court says it means.^*2*
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn2> Accordingly, for close
to 50 years, American lawyers and federal judges have mindlessly chanted
the absurd refrain that /"Roe v. Wade/ is the Law of the Land"; State
governments slavishly submitted; and 60 million babies died
<https://www.lifenews.com/2018/01/18/60069971-abortions-in-america-since-roe-v-wade-in-1973/>.

So who has the lawful authority to stop abortion?

*1.* /*Congress*/ *has constitutional authority to ban abortion in
federal enclaves and military hospitals*

Over the federal enclaves, Congress has constitutional authority to ban
abortion: Pursuant to Article I, §8, next to last clause, Congress is
granted "exclusive Legislation" over the District of Columbia, military
bases, dock-Yards, and other places purchased with the consent of the
State Legislatures (to carry out the enumerated powers).^*3*
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn3> Article I, §8, cl.14
grants to Congress the power to make Rules for the government and
regulation of the Military Forces. Accordingly, for the specific
geographical areas described at Article I, §8, next to last clause, and
in US military hospitals everywhere, Congress has the power to make laws
banning abortion.

*2. But* /*federal courts*/ *have no constitutional authority over abortion*

Article III, §2, cl. 1 lists the ten categories of cases federal courts
have authority to hear. They may hear /only/ cases:

* "Arising under" the Constitution, or the Laws of the United States,
or Treaties made under the Authority of the United States ["federal
question" jurisdiction];

* Affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers & Consuls; cases of
admiralty & maritime Jurisdiction; or cases in which the U.S. is a
Party ["status of the parties" jurisdiction];
* Between two or more States; between a State & Citizens of another
State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States; and
between a State (or Citizens thereof) & foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects ["diversity" jurisdiction].^*4*
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn4>

/These are *the only* cases federal courts have authority to hear./
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 83
<http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed83.htm> (8th para):

"...the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is declared by
the Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly specified.
*The expression of those cases marks the precise limits beyond which
the federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction*, because the
objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification
would be nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive
authority." [boldface added]

Obviously, State laws restricting abortion don't fall within "status of
the parties" or "diversity" jurisdiction; and federal courts haven't
claimed jurisdiction on those grounds. Instead, they have asserted that
abortion cases "arise under" the US Constitution!

But in Federalist No. 80
<http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed80.htm> (2nd para),
Hamilton states that *cases "arising under the Constitution" concern*

**

"...the execution of the provisions *expressly contained* in the
articles of Union [the US Constitution]..." ^*5*
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn5> [boldface added]

Obviously, "abortion" is not "expressly contained" in the Constitution.
So it doesn't "arise under" the Constitution. In /Roe v. Wade/, the
Supreme Court had to /*redefine*/ the word/*,*/ "liberty," which appears
in §1 of the 14th Amendment, in order to claim that "abortion" "arises
under" the Constitution.

Section 1 of the 14th Amendment says:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
*liberty*, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
[boldface added] ^*6* <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn6>

/Do *you* see where it says that pregnant women have the "right" to
abortion?/ It isn't there! So this is what the Supreme Court did to
legalize killing babies: They said "liberty" means "privacy" and
"privacy" means state laws banning abortion are unconstitutional. /And
American lawyers and judges have slavishly gone along with this evil
absurdity ever since!/

*3. States must* /*reclaim*/ *their traditionally recognized* /*reserved
power*/ *to restrict abortion!*

Since "abortion" is a power reserved by the States or the People, State
Legislatures should reenact State Statutes restricting abortion.

When a lawsuit is filed in Federal District Court alleging that the
State Statute violates the US Constitution, the State Attorney General
should file a motion in the Court to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. He should point out that the Court has no constitutional
authority to hear the case; *that* /*Roe v. Wade*/ *is* /*void*/ *for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction*; that "abortion" is one of the many
powers reserved by the States; and that the State Legislature properly
exercised its retained sovereign power when it re-enacted the Statue
restricting abortion.

The State Attorney General should also advise the Court that if the
Court denies the Motion to Dismiss, the State will not participate in
the litigation and will not submit to any pretended Orders or Judgments
issued by the Court.

Now! Here is an interesting fact which everyone would already know if
they had had a proper education in civics: *Federal courts have no power
to enforce their own Judgments and Orders*. They must depend on the
Executive Branch of the federal government to enforce their Judgments
and Orders.^*7* <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn7>

Since President Trump has proclaimed his opposition to abortion
<https://www.lifenews.com/2019/06/19/president-donald-trump-slams-abortion-every-life-is-sacred-gift-from-god/>,
who believes that he would send in the National Guard to force the State
to allow physicians to kill more babies within the State? *Please
understand*: An opinion or ruling from a federal court means /nothing/
unless the Executive Branch chooses to enforce it.^*8*
<http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn8> THIS IS THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH'S "CHECK" ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH! If the President, in the
exercise of his independent judgment, thinks that an Order or Judgment
of a federal court is unconstitutional, it is his duty imposed by his
Oath of Office ^*9* <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fn9> to
refuse to enforce it.

*4. The modern day approach to dealing with absurd Supreme Court Opinions*

But most pro-life lawyers will tell you we should proceed as follows:
That we need to get a number of States to pass "heartbeat laws."
Pro-abortion forces will then file lawsuits in federal district courts
alleging that the heartbeat laws violate /Roe v. Wade/ and are
"unconstitutional." Most States will lose in the federal district
courts. But they can appeal to one of the 13 US Circuit Courts of
Appeal. Most of the States will also lose in the Circuit Court. But if
just one Circuit Court rules in favor of the heartbeat law, then there
will be "conflict" among the Circuits and the US Supreme Court is likely
to hear the issue. This will give the US Supreme Court the opportunity
[years from now] to revisit /Roe v. Wade/, and they /might/ overrule it!

But I suggest, dear Reader, that we must purge our thinking of the
assumption that we can't have a moral and constitutional government
unless Five Judges on the Supreme Court say we can have it. Since it is
clear that federal courts have no constitutional authority over
abortion, why do we go along with the pretense that they do? Why not
just man-up and tell them, /"You have no jurisdiction over this issue"/?

Our Framers would be proud of you.

*Endnotes:
*

*^1 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr1>* Accordingly, the
federal Heartbeat Bill and the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act,
to the extent they purport to apply outside federal enclaves and
military hospitals, are unconstitutional as outside the scope of powers
delegated to Congress over the Country at Large.

^2 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr2> The Supreme Court
was /created/ by Art. III, §1, US Constitution, and is completely
subject to its terms. As a mere "creature," it may not re-write the
document under which it holds its existence.

^3 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr3> In Federalist No.
43 <http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed43.htm> at 2.,
James Madison explains why Congress must have complete lawmaking
authority over the District of Columbia and the federal enclaves.

^4 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr4> The 11th Amendment
reduced the jurisdiction of federal courts by taking from them the power
to hear cases filed by a Citizen of one State against another State.

^5 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr5> Federalist No. 80
<http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed80.htm> (3rd & 13th
paras) illustrates what "arising under the Constitution" means: Hamilton
points to the restrictions on the power of the States listed at Art. I,
§10 and shows that if a State exercises any of those powers, and the
fed. gov't sues the State, the federal courts have authority to hear the
case.

^6 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr6>"Privileges and
immunities" and "due process" are ancient Principles of English
Jurisprudence well-known to earlier generations of American lawyers.
"Equal protection" within §1 of the 14th Amd't means that with respect
to the rights recognized by these ancient Principles, States were now
required to treat black people the same as white people. See Raoul
Berger, Government by Judiciary The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. <http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/675/0003_Bk.pdf>

^7 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr7> In Federalist No.
78 <http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed78.htm> (6th
para), Hamilton shows why federal courts have no power to enforce their
orders and judgments – they must rely on the Executive Branch to enforce
them:

"... the judiciary... will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses
the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature
not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. *The
judiciary,* on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth
of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment;
and *must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even
for the efficacy of its judgments."* [caps are Hamilton's; boldface
added]

^8 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr8> During the
Eisenhower administration, a federal court ordered the State of Arkansas
to desegregate their public schools. *But the Governor of Arkansas
refused to comply with the federal court orders. So President Eisenhower
sent in the National Guard to force Arkansas to admit black students to
a public school.* See this archived article
<https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0925.html#article>
from the New York Times.

Here, Eisenhower chose to enforce the Court's Order. But if he had
decided that he would NOT enforce it, the schools would have remained
segregated. /Federal courts are dependent on the Executive Branch of the
fed. gov't to enforce their Orders/! /This/ is what Hamilton is talking
about in Federalist No. 78.

^9 <http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/huldah/#fr9> The President's
Oath is to "...preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States" (Art. II, §1, last clause). It is not to obey the
Judicial Branch of the fed. gov't.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
/Publius Huldah is a retired litigation attorney who now lives in
Tennessee. Before getting a law degree, she got a degree in philosophy
where she specialized in political philosophy and epistemology (theories
of knowledge).

She now writes extensively on the U.S. Constitution, using the
Federalist Papers to prove its original meaning and intent. She shows
how federal judges and politicians have ignored Our Constitution and
replaced it with their personal opinions and beliefs. She also shows how
The People can, by learning our Founding Principles themselves, restore
our Constitutional Republic./

© Copyright 2019 by Publius Huldah
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